December 16, 2017
R v Millard and Smich 2015 ONSC 7561
This decision from 2015 was as a result of a pre-trial motion, where both defendants asked for a publication ban on all evidence adduced at the Bosma trial. The trial judge denied the request, but imposed a pub ban over all pre-trial motions under s. 648, until the end of the trial in the Laura Babcock murder case. Since the motion for a pub ban over the Bosma trial was part of the pre-trial motions, the judgment was subject to the pub ban on all pre-trial motions.
Justice Goodman granted the publication ban, pursuant to s. 648(1) on the pre-trial motions until the end of the Laura Babcock trial on the grounds that it was:
…reasonable to suggest that there is a greater likelihood that a potential juror in the applicants’ subsequent trial on the charges related to Babcock’s death, may become aware of the evidence arising out of the pre-trial applications in this case (Bosma) if reported by the media following the sequestration of the jury. Indeed, there was much evidence advanced during the numerous pre-trial motions including records or information regarding post-offence conduct, the quashing of various search warrants at several locations with emphasis on cellular devices and computers seized from the applicants; examination of these electronic devices, as well as extensive evidence surrounding the Eliminator. A good deal of this evidence will not be heard by the jury in this case…
Goodman J. went on to state:
 There is a direct correlation to the evidence ruled inadmissible in this case with their surrounding details and its potential application to the Babcock matter.
 …a high degree of prejudice exists from the nature of the pretrial motions and a potential juror’s deleterious impression from this evidence will be substantial. In my view, it cannot be dispelled by other reasonable means as outlined in Dagenais. A narrowly circumscribed remedy over pre-trial motions will meet the salutary objectives as provided in the jurisprudence.
 With respect to the pre-trial applications (currently subject to a publication ban), I am satisfied that the applicants have demonstrated the necessity to extend such a ban, at least until the conclusion of the Babcock trial.